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INTRODUCTION 
This paper has a modest goal. It does not aim to offer a 
strict evaluation of the so-called "social policies" or "welfare 
policies". Rather, its objective is to'put together the more 
general indicators and make a preliminary effort towards situat-
ing them in an historical perspective. 
The presentation is divided into four parts. The first 
contains some ideas on the relationship between welfare policies 
and economic development. The three sections that follow refer 
respectively to: the educational system, especially basic edu-
cation; housing and sanitation policies; and the health system, 
with special reference to the supply of medical and hospital 
services. 

I. WELFARE POLICIES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
International comparisons have shown that the welfcire expend-
itures of national governments bear a relationship to overall de-
velopment: the richer nations spend more money, as a proportion 
of 6NP, than do the poorer nations, so far as education, housing, 
health and related items are concerned. However, such a relation-
ship is perceptible only in the long run. Far from an automatic 
consequence of economic growth, the growth of welfare expenditures 
is a composite result of economic and "non-economic ", especially 
political factors. Far from keeping a linear relationship with 
the growth of GNP, therefore, it is more likely to exhibit a zig-
zag pattern, reflecting the political forces involved. 
Needless to say, the governments of developing nations are 
to some extent forced to allocate an increasing absolute amount 
of resources to welfare or welfare-related objectives as a re-
quirement of economic growth itself. This is most typically the 
case in the early stages of the development process, when the' 
levels of literacy and public health, for example, are simply too 
low to be neglected even by hard-minded technocrats. In a simpli-
fied model which begins with the 19th century pattern of "minimal'' 
government, we would thus have an early departure, characterized 
by increased welfare expenditures, as well as by relatively heavy 
investment in infra-structure (roads, electricity, and the like). 
Once, however, a development process is set rolling, even though 
welfare conditions in the country may remain extremely low, and 
eventually even worsen in some respects, governmental priorities 
tend to be reconsidered. In this second stage, there seems to 
be considerable ropm for different views and policies with regard 
to welfare expenditures. Political options thus become far more 
consequential, and governmental policy-makers start to differ 
markedly in their views as to how ambitious welfare goals ought 
to be. 
In the Brazilian case, the literature on government planning 
seems quite consensual with respect to the following two state-
ments, which we shall therefore take as points of departure for 
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the present study. First, it seems to have been in the mid-
fifties (and more specifically, in the Piano de Metas of the 
Kubitschek government, 1955-1960) that welfare investments ceas-
ed to be conceptualized as an ineluctable precondition of growth, 
and started to become more and more subject to a cost/benefit 
approach. This is not to say, of course, that such expenditures 
then began to decrease systematically, but rather that argument 
for them could no longer rest on those simple old assumptions in 
which humanitarian motives, and.common sense appeared ihdistinguish-
ably blended. Second, a consensus also seems to exist as: to the 
fact that wefare goals have been and remain a very low priority 
for Brazilian governments. The amount invested in education, 
health, housing and related services has tended to be well below 
what would be expected from Brazil's level of. economic development. 
As a result, no matter what policy is adopted, present governments 
will necessarily carry a heavy .burden accumulated during decades. 
The few existing studies of government action during the last 
ten or fifteen years, plus the analysis of official statistics 
and governmental plans, seem to make it very clear that welfare 
goals remain quite secondary in the thought of the Brazilian 
policy-makers. It is often pointed 6ut that, from this perspec-
tive, the transition from a democratic to ah authoritarian system 
made no difference at all. Given the narrow social base of the 
pre-19614 democratic regime, it is said, the policy pattern would 
end up being more or less the same as is now deliberately pursued 
by technically-qualified policy makers. 
These notions, now widespread in the literature about the 
Brazilian "miracle", seem to ommit a crucial point, namely that 
once a certain level of material devélopment has been reached, 
the key factor influencing the pattern of expenditure, and par-
ticularly the option between growth or stagnation of welfare ex-
penditures, is the give-and take of organized social groups, 
through the political process. The regime established in 196«t, 
'often described as an aggressively "modernizing" technocracy sup-
ported by the military, has clearly and strongly denied the 
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legitimacy of such 'political" methods of allocation, making itself 
virtually immune to societal pressures to increase welfare expendi-
tures. The government's behavior in this regard can,, of course,be 
explained in many ways, but a crucial factor, as observed above, is 
that governmental policy-makers cherish a strong belief in their 
own rationality, and do not deem it rational, at least for the 
time being, to assign a higher order of priority to welfare ob-
jectives. 
The policy makers' belief in the convenience of keeping wel-
fare goals modest is manifest, for example, in the plans adopted 
after 196^. It has been shown that their goals in the welfare 
field have been set far below those envisaged in the Piano Trienal 
(the last of the pre-1964 period); and, most notably, below the 
figures actually reached in the case of Education. ^^ Although 
the evidence just cited argues persuasively for the policy-makers' 
modesty with respect to welfare goals, detailed analysis of the 
successive plans does not argue as persuasively for their belief 
in their own rationality: the projections and gjals are widely 
discrepant from one plan to the next, the methodology is quite 
conventional, to put it mildly, and the factual information is 
rather poor, recent advances notwithstanding. In these circum-
stances, evaluation of the impact of welfare policies in recent 
years becomes a very hazardous task. In what follows, we shall 
briefly look at some of the basic indicators of educational, 
health and housing conditions, but it must be kept in mind that 
they reflect past under-investment as well, allowing for policy 
evaluation only in the sense that the order of priorities remains 
unchanged. 
II. EDUCATION 
Public investment in education in Brazil is more or less 
equally divided between the federal and the state governments; the 
1/ Kowarxck, Lücio, Estrategias do Planejamento Social no Brasil. 
Sao Paulo, Cadernos CEBRAP, N°2. 
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local governments (municipios) account for only 6 to 7 per cent of 
the total public money spent in this field. The Piano Decenal of 
1967 (which is not actually a plañ, but a set of broad guidelines) 
envisaged an increase in the proportion to be spent by the federal 
government, with a target of 51 per cent of the public investment 
in 1976. Public expenditure, in turn, is more or less ten times 
as large as private expenditure. According to Douglas H.Graham,, 
public expenditure reached 5.780.200 (in Cr$ of 1970) in 1970; 
private expenditure. in this same year reached 578.000. jForeign 
funds accounted for 181.000, thus.totalling 5.539.200, or 3.8 
. . . • ' 2 / • per cent of the Gross Domestic Product,. ~ This proportion is 
the highest since 1960, rising from 2.if in that year to 3.2. in 
1965 to 3.8 per cent in.1969/1970. It is therefore possible to 
say that aggregate expenditure in.education has in fact increased, 
and that this has been mostly the result of increased public in*-
vestment. . Accounting for 82 per .cent in I960 ., public expenditure 
now accoxmt for almost 90 per cent of the total. 
This rise in educational investment as a proportion of the 
GDP must be qualified, however, in several respects. One, al-
ready noted, is that it is mostly a long term correction for a 
level which was simply too low. Brazilian governments had.been 
geared towards reasonably coherent developmental policies for one 
or two decades, and more decisively towards a policy of industri-
alization since the fifties, while at the same time doing virtual-
ly nothing about illiteracy, inefficient schooling at the primary 
and secondary levels, or.a university system that seemed well on 
the way to petrification. Thus, the increase just observed does 
not deviate significantly from the pattern of under-investment 
in welfare, at least for the time being; it is better seen as 
a correction for one-sided,economic developmentalism which seemed 
2/ Graham,D.fi. ,, "The Growth, Change and Reform of Higher edu-
cation in Brazil'", in Riordan Roett, Editor, Brazil in the 
Sixties, Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1962. 
V this has been consistent with a reduction.of the relative 
amount destined to education in the expenditure of the 
federal government. 
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bound to react negatively upon economic performance itself. Second-
ly, the rise in educational expenditure is not as such a suffi-
cient indication of social betterment, since we do not know enough 
about its structure. A review of some major educational indi-
cators will serve to confirm both of these statements. 
a) Illiteracy. Table 1 shows the evolution of illiteracy in 
Brazil, for the population of 15 years of age and over, since the 
beginning of the century, by region. From an uniform and extreme-
ly high rate of illiteracy in the adult population, we see that in 
Table 1 
ILLITERACY AMONG THE POPULATION OF 15 YEARS AND OVER, BY 
REGION (Percentages) 
Region 








69.2 79.7 72.7 73.0 
71.If 83.7 75.8 68.0 80.2 
59.8 76.3 62.8 44.5 70.9 
60.1 76.2 58.0 43.8 64.5 
66.0 47.5 32.2 











3 3 6 
(18.146.977) 
Source; IBGE, Censos Demográficos. 
a/ Probability sample, 1.27 per cent of the population. 
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the sixties--and seventies Brazil^ confronts two problems: that 
rate is still very high (39.5 per cent in 1960, 33.6 per cent in 
1970). and hot at all uniform among regions. The North-East and 
Center-West regions are close to the national average/ but the 
South and the Northeast deviate sharply front'it, with rates of 
21.6 and 57.9 per cent, respectively. The East and South seem 
better off, but only in comparison with the rest of the country, 
since their rates of adult illiteracy are just slightly below the 
national average of other Latin AméMcan countries, and far abóvé 
the rate observed iin the preséñtly developed countries ai: the 
turn of the century. Needless to say, these regional inequali-
ties in literacy rates would appear in darker colours if we took 
specific states, and especially urban-rural settings i for compar-
ison. Thus, within the South-East region, adult illiteracy rates 
range from 11 per cent in Guanabara to t^S per cent , in Espirito 
Santo. In the Northeastern region, where all states have a major-
ity of illiterates in the adult population, differences range from 
50.3 per cent in Pernambuco to 61.7 per cent in Alagoas. 
In view of this situation, the government moved to establish 
the MOBRALCBrazilian Literacy Campaign) in 1970. Conceived as 
a vast operation involving the states and municipios, the 
target population of the MOBRAL was defined as all illiterate 
adults between m and 35 years of age in U57 municipios which 
concentrate.70 per cent of the country's total population. 
Although we do not have,data for an adequate evaluation of 
the results of the campaign, the government inaugurated in March, 
1974, has implicitly admitted that MOBRAL fell short of its 
objectives, ahá recommended that new methods or strategies be 
studied to deal,with adult illiteracy. The magnitude of the 
problem can be gauged by looking at the right column of Table 1: 
in absolute numbers, the illiterate population over 15 years of 
age increased by 2.331.000 from 1960 to 1970. Clearly, given the 
present rates of population growth, the problem is virtually un-
manageable unless the population below that age is absorbed by 
the primary school system. 
) 7 ( 
b) Elementary School. One of the main determinants of the 
size of the adult illiterate population at a time tg is, of 
course, the rate of enrollment of the non-adult population at 
time t^. The proportion of the non-adult population which is not 
presently attending elementary school is therefore the key factor 
to be considered. Table 2 shows the figures for elementary en-
rollment in 1970, for Brazil as a whole and for three states: Sao 
Paulo, Minas Gerais and Bahía. Sao Paulo ranks second in the adult 
literacy rate, and is the country's most populous and economically 
most important state. Minas Gerais, with the second largest popu-
lation, is close to the nation's average with respect to adult 
literacy. Bahía comes after Pernambuco in the adult literacy rate 
within the Northeastern region, with 51.6 per cent, being there-
fore at the upper extreme within that region, as suggested above. 
Table 2 
ENROLLMENT IN ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS FOR THE POPULATION 
OF 7-12 YEARS OF AGE, IN BRAZIL AND IN THREE SELECTED STATES 
(1970) 
State <A) (B) 
Population Enrollment (B/A) 
7-12 years 
Sao Paulo 2. ,612, .664 2. .059. ,481 78. ,8 
Minas Gerais 1. ,977, .171 1, .566. .805 79. .2 
Bahia 1, ,292, 625. .723 48. .4 
BRAZIL 15. .198 10. .380. ,230 68. ,1 
Source: IBGE, Censo Demográfico de 1970. 
Table 2 shows that 32 per cent of Brazil's population between 
7 and 12 years of age (almost 5 million) are not presently enrol-
led in elementary schools. As pointed out above, none of the 
Northeastern states has less than a majority of illiterates among 
the adult population. Here we see that Bahia, one of those 
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states , enrolls les=s than half of the population between 7 and 12 
years of age. — - ^ : . 
Needless'tp :sayj a host of problems, some which aíé out-
side, the reach of educational policies, hide themselves behipd 
these figures. It is well-known that the supply of educational 
facilities produces satisfactory returns in enrollment up to a 
point, büt tlien becomes wasteful. Socio-^ecohomic and cultural 
factors - including the need for the child's labor-force to 
suplement the family budget - affect the demand fos?' education, eji-
pressing themselves in high dropout rates, the quantitative im-
portance of these factors can be gauged by the fact that the eh*- • 
rollment figures are always somewhat inflated, including a large 
number of children who remain in, the sanie grade due "to failure. / 
V?hat happens to those who re&ch 'the age of 14 without com-
pleting their primary education? These are the hundreds of 
thousands of elementary school drop-outs. Irieligible for the 
secondary shool, neither are they an object of the well-publiciz-
ed concern with the illiterate population. For these, there... 
exists the ensino supletivo, mostly night classes, about which 
not very much is known.' Available statistics show a slow evo-
lution, as one might expect , from slightly over 300.000 in 196«+ 
to 720.000 in 1969. -
Given the. figures -for illiteracy and elementary education, . i 
entirely typical of an "underdeveloped" nation^ it seems point-
less, in an analysis pf welfare c'onditibns, to. study, the second-
ary and college levels in detailu The data presented thus far . 
make it evident that Brazil remains an extremely under-educated 
society. It is however interesting to point out, in conclusion, 
with regar^d to the period 1960-1970, that the higher the levei of 
U/ It would be necessary to connect these figures for the fact 
that at: least .-a small fraction may have completed their fele-
mentary schooling,and may even be already enrolled, in.the first 
grades of the secondary. This,however, would not significantly 
alter either the magnitude or the regional differences shown 
in the table. 
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education considered, the higher the rate of growth of the popu-
lation enrolled. Thus, making 1960 s 100, primary enrollment grew 
to 133 in 1965, to 172 in 1970; the secondary junior to 180 in 
1965, to 339 in 1970; the secondary senior, to 190 in 1965, to 
376 in 1970; and finally, the college and superior levels of 
education, grew to 167 in 1965, to H56 in 1970. These figures 
• seem to indicate that the main beneficiaries of the aggregate in-
crease in educational expenditure (as a proportion of GDP) were 
primarily the rising middle strata. This is nothing but a hypo-
thesis, which we cannot at the moment examine in further detail, 
but one that seems consistent with the information presented here 
and with other studies on Brazilian education. 
III. HOUSING AND SANITATION 
Housing is an evident and indispensable component of any 
welfare index. However, even less than in the field of education, 
we cannot approach the study of housing conditions simply in terms 
of the supply by governmental or private agents of 'X" units. The 
housing shortage, like illiteracy, in Brazil and in most other 
Latin American nations, has an overwhelming character, making it 
ludicrous to take shortage estimates very seriously. We shall 
thus concentrate our attention on the following two points. First, 
a brief overview of the housing policies adopted in the last ten 
years, on the assumption that here we do in fact have important 
innovations; and second, an overview of indicators of public 
sanitation, especially water and sewage systems, on the assumption 
that the minimal quality of housing will be determined, for a long 
time to come, by the quality of such public services. 
a) The National Housing Bank. —^ The basic development with 
respect to housing was the creation, in August of 1964, of the 
National Housing Bank (BNH). The objectives and guidelines for 
* 
5/ See Piano Estratégico de Desenvolvimento, 1968-1970. On the 
BNH, see also BoIatfi,GabrieI, Aspectos Socio-Economicos do 
Piano Nacional de Habitacao (Dissertacao, Unxversidade de 
Sao Paulo, 1972. 
v 
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million more than in 1960. Table 3 shows their distribution ac-
cording to water source utilized and to type of sewage system. 
With i»espect to water supply, although much less than half 
of the households were linked to the public network in 1970, 
there is a perceptible increase from 21.0 to 32.8 per cent. As 
to sewage, however, there has been,if anything, a deterioration of 
conditions: while the public network reached 17.5 per cent, as 
against 13.9 per cent in 1960, the category rudimentary cess-
pool is more than eight percentage points larger, reaching 33.3 
per cent in 1970. In addition, it is necessary to point out 
that the census collapsed the category "other forms" with the 
category "without information", in the case of water; and the 
categories "without installations" and ''without information", in 
the case of sewage. The category resulting from this procedure 
the largest, with respect to water as well as to sewage, thus 
making the data here presented quite inadequate for a more re-
fined analysis. But we can at least examine the distribution 
of households according to these items of infra-structure and 
to the regions of the country where they are located in Table H: 
Table 3 
OCCUPIED PRIVATE DWELLINGS ACCORDING TO TYPE OF 
WATER-SUPPLY AND SEWAGE INSTALLATIONS 
Water Sanitary Installations 























32.8 24.7 42.4 17.5 9.5 33.3 39.8 
Source; AnuSrio Estatístico do Brasil, 1971., 
a 
Table 4 
PERMANENT PRIVATE DWELLINGS - INSTALUTIONS EXISTING BY REGION, 1970 
(Percentages) 
Existing Installations and Utilities 





























BRAZIL 17 628 699 
(100.0) 
32.8 24.6 42.6 47.6 13.2 13.4 29.7 4.3 ' 39.4 
North 584 379 
(100.0) 
19.2 17,5 63.3 27.3 1.6 7.2 45.3 8.0 37.9 
North-
east 
5 140 868 
(100.0) 
12.4 8.3 79.3 23.3 2.3 5.6 18.5 2.6 71.0 
South-
east 
7 901 143 
(100.0) 
51.6 27.0 21.4 68.7 24.0 19.9 28.7 5.3 22.1 
South 3 085 802 
(100.0) 





19.9 33.6 46.5 28.6 7.4 7.6 33.6 1-9 49.5 
M 
Source; IBGE, Censo Demográfico, 1970. 
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Here, too-, regional inequalities are evident. While in the 
Southeast, the country' developed and industrialized heartland, 
at least a bare majority (51,6%) of the households are served by 
the public water network, this.proportion is only 12.li per cent 
in the Northeast, 19.2 per cent in the Northj and 19.9 per cent 
in the Center-West. Perhaps even more striking is the fact that 
almost 80 per cent of the units of the Northeast aré classified 
as "without installations or without information"', followed by 
the North with 63.3 per cent so classified, and by the Center-
West with ii6.5 per cent. 
The distribution.according to sewage, systems follows the 
same pattern. While 21.0 per cent of the households located in 
the Southeast are served by the public network, slightly more 
than 7 per cent are linked to it in the South and Center-West, 
2.3 per cent in the Northeast, and 1.6 per cent in the North. 
And again, the category "without information or without instal-
lations" account for 71.0 per ¿ent in the Northeast, U9.5 per 
cent in the Center-West, 39.4 per cent in the North. Table 5 
presents the distribution.of municipios with and without water 
and sewage systems in 1960 and 1970 for Brazil as a wholé and 
among the three states selected for comparison: Sao Paulo, 
Minas Gerais and Bahia. It shows that, while some improvement 
can be perceived with regard to water, this is not the case in-
sofar as sewage is concerned. The increase, in the number of 
municipios, especially at the beginning of the sixties, was not 
followed by the construction of sewage s y s t e m s I n 1960, 32.7 
per cent of the municipios possessed such an infrastructure, as 
against 26.1 per cent in 1970. Coaiparing the three states. We 
see that at least a small increasé took place in Sao Paulo; but 
not in Minas Gerais and Bahia, where many new (and old) 
municipios still lack a public sewage" system, 
y 
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Table 5 
/ 
PUBLIC WATER AND SEWAGE SERVICES IN MUNICIPIOS 1960/70 



















1960 2 779 1 354 910 48.7 32.7 
1970 3 949 2 332 1 029 59,1 26=1 
Sao Palio 
1960 504 370 287 73.4 56.9 
1970 571 485 354 84.9 62.0 
Minas 6, 
1960 485 409 285 84.3 58.8 
1970 722 629 407 87.1 56.4 
Bahia 
1960 194 64 4 3 33.0 24.2 
1970 336 162 50 48.2 14.9 
Source: Anuarios Estatísti<x>s - IBGE. 
V 
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IV. HEALTH 
As with housing, it seems unnecessary to emphasize once 
again that health levels are notoriously low in Brazil. Brazil 
entered the seventies making international news with respect to 
public health: bad news, such as the spread of epidemic dis-
eases and the stabilization at high levels - if not, in fact, em 
increase - in infant mortality. The interpretation of these and 
other occurrences in this area, must of course be left to health 
experts, although we can take note of the fact that many of them ^ 
have emphasized socioeconomic conditions, most notably those re-
lated to malnutrition and environmental factors. 
Water and sewage systems, considered in the previous section, 
are undoubtedly indicators of such health-relevant socioeconomic 
conditions. Our intent here is to consider briefly some indi-
cators of the supply of financial, hospital and human resources. 
These are obviously under the purview of governmental policyj in 
fact, all three are keystones in health planning. And here again, 
it seems possible to conjecture that governmental policies had 
negligible influence in the changes recorded during the decade. 
The pattern of low priority and inefficient planning, typical of 
the whole welfare field, seems to have been kept. The conse-
quences, however, were bound to be extremely negative, due, 
among other things, to the reduction of real wages, as shown in 
other parts of this report. 
The resources allocated to the Ministry of Health in the t 
federal budget have been declining systematically. Taken as a 
proportion of the actual expenditures, such resources amounted ^ 
to U.ll per'cent in 1955, 3.95 per cent in 1960, 2.67 per cent 
in 1965, and 1.11 per cent in 1970. 
In order to estimate the magnitude of health expenditures as I 
a proportion of the 6DP, it would be necessary to study not only 
what goes on at the state and municipal levels, but also a 
complex and (unlike in the field of education) fast growing 
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private sector.—^ Such an effort is clearly beyond our present 
scope 3 but it seems in order to stress that the relative reduction 
of health resovirces in the federal budget may be associated with 
this trend towards the privatization of medical services. Table 7 
shows that while the niomber of public and private non-profit 
hospitals grew slightly between 1965 and 1970, the number of 
private profitable hospitals rose from 9i+5 to 1 708. The latter 
category thus became the largest so far as number of hospitals is 
concerned. In percentages, we see that the public and private non-
profit categories reduced their participation in the total. 
Table 6 
INFANT MORTALITY IN SAO PAULO 












Soi.ii-ce: Jc)cio"7:/Sii,.os ~ e Vera Ronchezel, 
"Evolucao da Mo:?t.i<.lidade Geral, infan-
til e proporcional no Brasil'', mimeo. 
£/ A recent study argues that public expenditure on health has 
grown somewhat faster than the GDP between 1965 and 1969. 
See Silva, F., A., R., and Mahar, D., Saude e Previdencia 
Social, IPEA, Relatorio de Pesquisa N°21, 1974, pág. 83. 
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This trend towards privatization, combined with declining 
real wages cannot fail to elicit sei"'ious concern. The data in 
our table, needless to say, are far from sufficient to evaluate 
recent policies with respect to health. It would be necessary 
to know more about the administrative and spacial organization 
and planning of the health field. In particular, it would be 
necessary to know whether the relative reduction in the public 
sector reflects some new long term strategy. Whatever the case 
may be, 1970 data clearly indicate that Brazil cannot yet boast 
high levels of health development. The ratio of hospital beds per 
thousand persons improved only slightly, from 3.0 to 3.8 per cent 
between 1960 and 1970; the ratio of physicians per thousand,from 
U.6 to 6.8 per cent. Both ratios are almost twice as large if we 
consider Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro separately, reflecting the 
strong geographical concentration of health resources. With 23 
per cent of the population in 1960, Sao Paulo and Rio concentrated 
39.11 per cent of the hospital beds, and 48.4 per cent of the 
medican personnel. In 1970, with 23.6 per cent of the population, 
the percentage of hospital beds remained the same, whereas the 
percentage of physicians declined somewhat, from 48.4 to 44.1 per 
cent. 
Table 7 
G? HOSPITALS ACCORDING TO MAINTAINING ENTITY 
(1955-70) O EP^iZIL AND 4 CHOSEN STATES 















i Making Total 
BRASIL 1955 400 1 952 2 352 17.0 — _ 83.0 100.0 
1960 371 2 176 2 547 14.6 - „ 85.4 100.0 
1565 461 945 1 444 2 850 16.2 33.2 50.7 83.8 100.0 
1970 534 I 708 1 538 3 &30 15.2 44.6 40.2 84.8 100.0 
Sao Paulo 1S55 35 447 482 7.3 -- 92.7 100.0 
1960 44 483 sn R.3 ~ - 91.7 100.0 
1965 43 151 339 543 7.9 29.7 62.4 92.1 100.0 
1970 54 291 3Ó3 713 7.5 40.8 51.6 92.4 100,0 
Minas 1955 32 345 377 8.5 — - 91.5 100.0 
1560 37 355 352 9.4 _ - 90.6 100,0 
1965 42 99 258 393 10.5 24.8 64.7 89.5 100.0 
1970 49 1.^ 4 282 515 9.5 .35.7 54.8 90.5 100,0 
Bahia 1955 22 75 98 22.4 _ - 77.6 100,0 
1960 25 80 105 23.8 - _ 76.2 100.0 
1565 19 19 59 97 19.6 19.6 60.8 80.4 100.0 
1370 31 48 61 140 22.1 34.3 43.6 77.9 100.0 
Guanabara 1955 68 106 174 39.1 - 50.9 100.0 
1960 63 95 153 39.9 - - 60.1 100.0 
1965 67 67 39 173 38.7 38.8 22.5 61.3 100.0 
1970 65 92 41 1?8 32,8 46,5 20.7 67.2 100.0 
M V.O 
Sources Anuarios Estatletii^'js r.iVE. 
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CONCLUSIOM 
In spite of the uncertainty of ¿cvaülable statistics and of 
the scarcity of rigorous evaluatiye studies, the basic charac-
teristics of Brazilian welfare policies seem to be clear. There 
is no doubt that Brazil has been until now an under-educated 
country, as well as an under-covered one concerning housing and 
sanitation. The levels reached in all of these aspects seem un-
satisfactory vis-a-vis the country's degree of urbanization and 
industrialization. Though many difficulties are involved in this 
type of comparison, the differences appear in a clear way and, 
furthermore, they are growing and publicly recognized. 
Nevertheless, in two other aspects, extrapolations should be 
done carefully because of the weakness of our present knowledge. 
As we saw -in the first section, not only the political oligarch-
ies were the ones to define the above mentioned pattern of ex-
penditure in welfare; maybe they were not even the principal 
factor. The extent to which under-expenditure in education,' 
health, etc. was the result of deliberate options - and it is 
important in this context to say "the extent to which" - it was 
obviously an option taken by the planners themselves and by the 
"developmentisf technocracies of all types. It is possible 
therefore that - cruel or not, serving or not the dominant 
oligarchies -, this pattern followed in its beginning an eco-
nomic rationality. This does not mean, obviously, that such 
rationality exists still today or, even less, that this approach 
of the problem maintains the validity it had thirty, forty or 
fifty years ago. In sum., the infornia'tion presented in this 
study aims to contribute to a characterization of a regularity 
or pattern; it does not try to answer to the evaluative 
questions that may be raised in this area. 
In the same way, this study does not intend to close the 
door to research on the socio-political structure that has been 
the basis for the described pattern; on the contrary, it tries 
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to open it. It has been rightfully mentioned that concerning 
nany aspects the Brazilian panorama is of "non-change' rather than 
of change. In the same way, the study of welfare policies in 
Brazil suggests that the situation that must be explained is the 
degree of "illfare", a generalized situation that persists in 
spite of economic growth. 
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